Title
REPORT
HOMELAND SECURITY
FUNDING FOR THE
CITY OF PITTSBURGH
Report by the
Office of City Controller
TOM FLAHERTY
CITY CONTROLLER
Anthony Pokora, Deputy Controller
Anabell Kinney, Esq., Management Auditor
Gloria Novak, MED, Assistant Management Auditor
PERFORMANCE AUDITORS:
Trudy Hoover, MIR
Bette Ann Puharic
Mike Turpin, Support Staff
January, 2005
January 31, 2005
To the Honorables: Mayor Tom Murphy
and Members of Pittsburgh City Council:
The Office of City Controller is pleased to present this report on the City's Homeland Security Funding. The report examines whether the City has maximized available federal funding for homeland security.
Federal homeland security funds became available after the September 11 attacks to increase local preparedness and ability to deal with terrorist attacks. The Department of Homeland Security issues grants to the states which then are responsible for distributing funds through application requests. Pittsburgh, along with 13 surrounding counties, comprises Pennsylvania Region 13. The Region 13 Task Force is responsible for assessing the needs of its region and submitting approved equipment and training applications to the State for reimbursement.
The City requested $3.8 million for equipment and training in 2003 and $4.5 million in 2004. To date, the City has not yet received any of its 2003 and 2004 funding requests.
A federal Task Force on State and Local Homeland Security Funding identified obstacles that have caused delays in federal funds reaching local government. These factors are outside the City's control. However, it also appears that untimely submissions by the City may also be a factor in the delayed funding.
The City's 2003 application for equipment was submitted to the State in March 2004 and its 2004 application was just submitted on November 5, 2004. City officials state that lack of manpower prevents more timely submissions.
The City was ineligible for overtime personnel reimbursement during Orange level alerts in 2003 and 2004 because submitted documentation did not comply with program guidelines. To obtain future reimbursement, all City departments should be educated on how to properly document overtime pay during Orange level alerts.
Two other concerns regarding the City's homeland security preparedness must be noted. First, the City does not have a coordinated evacuation plan. An evacuation plan must be developed to avoid the gridlock that occurred on 9/11/01 as downtown workers tried to leave the city. Second, the omission of the City's Emergency Management Agency by the Act 47 Team and Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority is glaring. These oversight boards should address how its fiscal constraints are to address the City's security needs.
Sincerely,
Tom Flaherty
This report is in response to an inquiry by Pittsburgh's City Controller. The financial distress of the City of Pittsburgh has commanded the scrutiny of all the City's finances including the reimbursement process of Homeland Security. Generally accepted governmental auditing standards as established by the United States General Accounting Office were followed.
BACKGROUND
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 security to the United States has become one of the top priorities of the federal government. Immediately following this crisis, the US Department of Homeland Security was created to "oversee, monitor and administer ways to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism at a national level".
In July of 2002, the George W. Bush Administration approved the National Strategy for Homeland Security. This initiative recognizes the important roles that state and local public safety departments play in combating potential terrorist threats and actions. Being equipped, trained and able to respond to a terrorist attack in a timely and efficient manner is crucial to keeping all Americans safe.
Several laws were passes by Congress to help in the fight against terrorism. The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution law which allocates state and local governments with funding was passed in February of 2003. Also in 2003, the enactment of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act provided additional federal funding to expand these homeland security efforts. Strengthening and improving local response to acts of terrorism involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) such as Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or Explosive (CBRNE) weapons is the goal of these laws.
The federal Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) is responsible for providing financial assistance to selected urban areas, port authorities and mass transit systems under the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). Direct funding from the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution is provided to 7 selected urban areas. Another 30 selected urban areas receive funding through their particular State through the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations. The UASI Grant Programs allows each of these high-threat urban areas to improve its ability to combat terrorism by receiving specialized equipment, training, planning, and exercise needs. A coordinated effort by the core city/counties and their respective state government is needed to implement these activities. Pittsburgh and its Region 13 qualify for this UASI funding.
As outlined in the Program Guidelines and Application Kit, there are a number of requirements and authorizations that must be followed in administering the UASI grant program. In addition, the Program Guidelines provide a detailed list of authorized program expenditures that qualify for funding reimbursement. Theses authorized expenditures include the following: Planning, equipment acquisition, training, exercises and operational activities. A detailed description of "allowable" planning, equipment, training, exercise and operational costs are also provided, along with a summation of the Grant Reporting Requirements.
Authorized equipment purchases include:
1. Personal Protective Equipment
2. Explosive Device Mitigation and Remediation Equipment
3. CBRNE Search and Rescue Equipment
4. Interoperable Communications Equipment
5. Detection Equipment
6. Decontamination Equipment
7. Physical Security Enhancement Equipment
8. Terrorism Incident Prevention Equipment
9. CBRNE Logistical Support Equipment
10. CBRNE Incident Response Vehicles
11. Medical Supplies and Limited Types of Pharmaceuticals
12. CBRNE Reference Materials
Each of the equipment purchases listed above is further expanded to encompass numerous devices and identification agents and kits. The CBRNE Reference Materials details allowable exercise costs, training costs and planning and administrative costs.
Application deadlines exist to receive any funding under this program and must be accompanied by an extensive listing of how the equipment or funds are to be used. It appears these deadline dates are June 30 and November 30. There are also Grant Reporting Requirements for any grant received in which the grant is active as well as for periods where no grant activity occurs. Progress reports to each state, in our case, Pennsylvania are due within 30 days after the end of the reporting periods for the life of the award.
Task Force on State and Local Homeland Security Funding Report
The federal government's mission of providing the resources to state and local governments to prepare and train their first responders is an important job in the fight against terrorism. Regrettably, obstacles have caused delays in federal funds reaching these local governments and first responders in a timely fashion including Pittsburgh and its designated Region 13. As a result, Homeland Security Secretary, Tom Ridge, formed a Task Force on State and Local Homeland Security Funding to examine the causes of these delays and to find solutions.
A report was released in June of 2004 that examined the funding process, identified problem areas and made recommendations to expedite the receipt of homeland security funds to those responsible for preventing and responding to acts of terrorism. This Task Force was comprised of several governors, mayors, county officials and other political leaders from across the country and was brought together on a bipartisan basis. The Task Force worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security and officials at every level of government to gain information and facts.
The following is a summary of the findings that emerged from the work of this Task Force taken right from their report:
· The reimbursement requirement is problematic, especially for cash-strapped municipalities.
· The need to rapidly procure and deploy homeland security-related equipment conflicts, at times, with state and local buying regulations, policies and procedures, and the procurement process.
· Many state and local governments lack the purchasing power to obtain the goods and services in a timely fashion.
· The lack of national standards guiding the distribution, tracking and oversight of homeland security-related grant funds contributes to delays in disbursement.
· The development of program guidelines and long-term operational plans need to also address the urgent security needs such as reimbursement for overtime pay and risk-based funding.
· State and local governments are often overwhelmed and understaffed to properly deal with the complex grant system workload.
· Communication gaps exist between all levels of governments.
· Local jurisdictions have expectations that are unrealistic given the limited amount of funding available.
· Unavoidable equipment backlogs and vendor delays have slowed the process.
It is the conclusion of the Task Force that there are several issues that have contributed to problems in the funding process. The Task Force also recognizes that some procedures and practices that delay the disbursement of funds exist to ensure accountability and any modification should be done cautiously. They also warn that "the speed of disbursement or draw-down by itself may not be the best performance measure to determine whether these, or future, grant programs are operating effectively". They believe these two points are critical in the funding process to improve national security measures.
The Task Force recognizes the importance of balancing the timely disbursement of funds to the state, county and local levels and the need to ensure that these funds meet the federal requirements. Consequently, the Task Force identified four areas where improvement was needed and developed a number of recommendations to address the barriers in the administrative, regulatory, statutory and operational process that delay the disbursement of these funds. Hopefully, these recommendations will help speed up the disbursement process within each state and allow the first responders to be armed and trained to counter any terrorist's threat or act.
The Homeland Security Advisory System
The Homeland Security Advisory System was developed to place our nation on alert and be prepared to deal with terrorist attacks. This system is meant to be compulsory for the executive branch of government and strongly suggested, although voluntary, to other levels of government, as well as to the private sector. The system consists of five specific threat levels that are described and coded by a color. These color-coded levels, from highest to lowest are as follows:
Severe = Red;
High = Orange;
Elevated = Yellow;
Guarded = Blue;
Low = Green.
These color-coded levels relate to the increased chances of a terrorist attack upon our nation. The bottom line is the higher the threat conditions, the greater the risk of a terrorist attack. According to the Terrorism Research Center (TRC) web site, the term "risk" here "includes both the probability of an attack occurring and its potential gravity". These threat conditions are assigned in accordance with the consultation of the Attorney General and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Threat conditions may be issued nationwide, geographically or for a particular business sector. These threat conditions are periodically reviewed to determine whether adjustments are reasonable.
Each level of a threat condition should include the implementation of protective measures and preparedness. The TRC also states that "Protective Measures are the specific steps an organization shall take to reduce its vulnerability or increase its ability to respond during a period of heightened alert. The authority to craft and implement Protective Measures rests with the Federal departments and agencies". These departments and agencies are required to submit an explanation of the appropriate protective measures they have implemented for each threat level to the federal government in the form of an annual report. The federal government also encourages that each state and their local municipalities evaluate their protective measures to deal with each threat level.
Whether to publicly announce threat conditions is made on an individual case basis by the Attorney General and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Again, the TRC web site states: "Every effort shall be made to share as much information regarding the threat as possible, consistent with the safety of the Nation. The Attorney General shall ensure, consistent with the safety of the Nation, that State and local government officials and law enforcement authorities are provided the most relevant and timely information". Any useful information that would benefit the state and local levels would be transmitted accordingly through the appropriate communication chain of command.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Attorney General are responsible for determining what information regarding threat assessments and reports is provided to the President of the United States. In addition, the Vice President, Assistant to the President, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs are also notified of national threat reports. If these reports are relevant, they will be passed on for review by the "wider interagency community" which would include local governments.
The decision on which threat level to assign involves a number of considerations including a "qualitative assessment" of the threat information received. The Terrorism Research Center (TRC) states that the evaluation of this threat information shall include, but not be limited to, the following factors:
1. To what degree is the threat information credible?
2. To what degree is the threat information corroborated?
3. To what degree is the threat specific and/or imminent?
4. How grave are the potential consequences of the threat?
The United States remains at risk to terrorist attacks now and in the future. It is important that our Country remain vigilant, prepared, and ready to combat terrorist attacks at all threat levels. The following threat conditions outline the increasing risk of terrorist attacks at each level and suggest some protective measures that the federal departments and agencies are responsible for developing and implementing. These conditions are taken directly from the TRC web site:
Severe Condition--Red
A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. Under most circumstances, the Protective Measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies also should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
1. Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs;
2. Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained teams or resources;
3. Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and
4. Closing public and government facilities.
High Condition--Orange
A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
1. Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces organizations;
2. Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering alternative venues or even cancellation;
3. Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and
4. Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only.
Elevated Condition--Yellow
An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
1. Increasing surveillance of critical locations;
2. Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions;
3. Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and
4. Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.
Guarded Condition--Blue
This condition is declared when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Condition, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:
1. Checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations;
2. Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and
3. Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act appropriately.
Low Condition--Green
This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks. Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and implement:
1. Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective Measures;
2. Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures; and
3. Institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to examine how the City of Pittsburgh has utilized its designated funding from the State and Local Homeland Security Funding to increase its ability and preparedness to deal with any threat or act of terror. As the Task Force has reported, there are obstacles in the disbursement process of these funds to the local safety management departments nationwide. An attempt is made to answer the following: Has the City of Pittsburgh done its job to the best of its ability to maximize their available funding? What are the barriers the City has encountered and what can be done to overcome them? How were the funds used to help secure the City?
These federal funds are to be used to reimburse each state, county or local governments for costs incurred for the authorized costs associated with improving their security to combat terrorism. The Department of Homeland Security issues the grant awards to the respective state. It is then the state's responsibility to distribute the funds per the application requests received.
Generally, funds are to be used within a two-year period to allow for the completion of the training and exercise programs. Expenses for equipment would normally be spent more quickly the application requests are submitted and approved. Additionally, the state is permitted to take 20% of the total grant allocation. As stated in the 2003 UASI guidelines, this money is "to complement state assets that will provide direct assistance to the urban area in the event of a terrorist attack, excluding any administrative costs." In 2004, this 20% portion to the state amounted to $2.38 million.
In Pennsylvania, the City of Pittsburgh, along with 13 surrounding counties, make up Region 13. The Region 13 Task Force began in November of 1998, approximately three years before the terror attacks of 9/11, with Mercer County joining in May of 1999 making the total 14 instead of 13, but the name "Region 13" was already assigned and was not changed.
The Region 13 Task Force is comprised of key personnel from "law enforcement, emergency medical services, emergency management, the fire service, hazardous materials, public works, governmental administrative, public safety communications, healthcare and public health". It meets monthly to prepare and plan for any terrorist threat or attack that would impact, not only the City of Pittsburgh, but surrounding counties at a regional level. The goal is to offer assistance at a regional level to local responders in the evet of an emergency situation.
An attempt was made to attend the November 2004 Region 13 Task Force meeting but this meeting was closed to the public.
Region 13 is responsible for assessing the needs of all the municipalities in its region and submitting the approved equipment and training applications to the state for reimbursement. These funds are to be used to strengthen and improve the ability to respond to acts of terrorism and to deal with any type of CBRNE weapons. Funds are distributed to each state to allocate regionally through an application process. In 2003, $6.82 million was allocated to Region 13 to be used to improve responses to any CBRNE weapon attack. In 2004, $9.52 million was allocated to Region 13.
Originally Pittsburgh's mayor did not want to be included with this regional perspective. He felt that the City should be the administrator of the regions funds since Pittsburgh is at the core. This was unacceptable to the State, the logic being that the City of Pittsburgh would be the center of an attack and would need help from its surrounding neighbors to respond and recover.
Each of the 14 emergency management coordinators are responsible for submitting a list of equipment and training needs to Region 13 for approval. As outlined in the flow chart found in the appendix, these lists are discussed and approved by members of the Region 13's Equipment Committee. Once approved, they are forwarded to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) for approval and then submitted to the Federal Homeland Security Review for final approval.
In Pennsylvania, once approved, most of the equipment submitted is purchased by the state and shipped to the local municipality through the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA). According to the City's Deputy Director/Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator there is currently only one individual at PEMA who is responsible for the procurement of these federal funds. The auditors attempted to verify PEMA's staffing levels, application process and the status of the City's funding (reported to be $3.5 million*) but, as of this writing, no one from the State has returned the call. Without State cooperation a proper analysis can not be completed.
The City Emergency Management Agency (CEMA) operates under the Office of the Mayor. It has one individual, the City's Deputy Director/Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator, and an intern responsible for coordinating Homeland Security efforts throughout the City. For the City's Deputy Director/WMD Coordinator participation in the Region 13's task force is also a responsibility.
This apparent understaffing at the City and state levels has caused delays in the whole funding process.
FINDING: Given Pittsburgh's current financial crisis, it can not purchase security equipment outright. The City needs to take advantage of the available Homeland Security Funding. Without such equipment, Pittsburgh remains unprepared to deal with a state of emergency.
*As reported in a November 22, 2004 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article.
SCOPE
The scope of this report is to examine how the City of Pittsburgh has utilized the Federal Funding designated to its region to improve its readiness and capability to prevent, respond to and recover from threats or acts of terrorism for the years 2003 and 2004. The federal funding allocated to our region 13 was $6.82 million and $9.52 million, respectively.
The scope of this report was limited because the City has not yet received any of the funding for the years 2003 and 2004. As a result, the auditors could not audit the funds received but could only investigate the funding process and report on the City's ability and management to maximize the receipt of these federal funds.
OBJECTIVES
1. Determine how the City has utilized the federal funds allocated for improving its overall capability to prevent, respond to and recover from threats or acts of terrorism.
2. Report the City's procedures and systems in place to prevent, respond to and recover from threats or acts of terrorism.
3. Assess the City's procedures and practices in place to secure receipt of the Federal Funding available to improve its readiness to combat threats or acts of terrorism.
4. Identify any barriers the City has encountered in receiving funding.
METHODOLOGY
The auditors met with the City's Director of Operations and the Deputy Director/ WMD Coordinator. The following documents were received:
1. Office for Domestic Preparedness' Fiscal Year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program,
2. Part II Program Guidelines and Applications Kit, and,
3. The US Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Advisory Council's Report from the Task Force on State and Local Homeland Security Funding dated June 2004, 2003 & 2004
4. Urban Areas Security Initiative Grant Program (UASIGP) .
The procedures and process for receiving the State and Local Homeland Security Funding was explained by the City of Pittsburgh's Deputy Director/WMD Coordinator. Copies of the City's requested equipment for 2003 and 2004 were received. The needs assessment process and how these needs are determined on a departmental basis were explained. Also received were copies of the Terrorism/WMD Project Worksheet used to evaluate and rate these individual requests. A final score is assigned to each request which is used to prioritize what is needed for the City as a whole. These prioritized items are then submitted to the State for approval and shipment to the City. A flow chart outlining this whole process was provided and is included in the Appendix of this report.
This report's weakness is its single source of information for the City's Homeland Security involvement: the City's Deputy Director/Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator. As part of accepted governmental auditing standards, as established by the United States General Accounting Office, information should be verified by a second source. This was unable to occur because PEMA, the State agency controlling the federal funds, failed to respond to the auditors inquiries.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In November of 2004, WTAE television station aired a story about Pittsburgh being a target for terrorist activity in 2001. This activity included an active terrorist cell within City limits. In Hamburg, Germany, a terrorist plan was revealed to hit the Federal Courthouse with a tractor trailer filled with explosives; much like what happened in Oklahoma City. Surveillance plans of Pittsburgh were also discovered in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This year, in Washington County, two men drew local authority's attention when they wanted to buy fuel tanker trucks.
On 9/11/2001 those who worked within the Golden Triangle, can recall the traffic GRIDLOCK as downtown workers tried to leave the City. Mayhem was the mainstay. Neither the City nor the County had an emergency evacuation plan to execute. Clearly an evacuation plan was needed.
FINDING: As of the writing of this report, the City of Pittsburgh DOES NOT HAVE A COORDINATED CITY EVACUATION PLAN IN PLACE.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 1:
The status of Pittsburgh's fiscal condition is well documented. However grave Pittsburgh's finances, its need for emergency preparedness should be seen as an equal priority. The lack of concern given to the City's Emergency Management Agency (CEMA), by the Act 47 Team and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Authority (ICA) is glaring. This omission by these two State oversight groups must be addressed. Given Pittsburgh's history as a terrorist target, CEMA's needs should be top priority.
The USAI program guidelines provide a number of deadline dates for required application and information requests. The City's Deputy Director/WMD Coordinator assured us that the City has not lost any funding because of not meeting these deadlines even though it appears that these deadlines have not been met. So far, there has not been any ramification of not meeting these deadlines. For example, the natural disaster flooding that occurred in the Pittsburgh region in early October took precedence over these USAI submission applications and delayed the funding process further. It should be noted that these applications can be submitted on-line.
The auditors requested a timeline for the City's applications submitted. As of the end of November 2004, none of the funding was awarded to the City of Pittsburgh or Region 13 for either 2003 or 2004 submitted applications. The application for requested equipment for 2003 was submitted to the State in March 2004. For 2004, the application was just submitted on November 5, 2004.
FINDING: The City has submitted its 2003 equipment application requests in March of 2004 and its 2004 applications in November 2004.
FINDING: The auditors were told that the City's Deputy Director/WMD Coordinator operates on a deadline-oriented schedule because of staffing shortages. Therefore, the City waits until the state gives a 30-day notice to submit its request applications for these Homeland Security funds. As a result, the City has to scramble to put its request together. The City claims that it does not have the manpower to meet this deadline in a more timely fashion.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 2:
The City should be prepared and ready to submit its equipment and training request application before waiting for a 30-day notice by the State is given. This process should be done on a departmental basis and submitted to the Deputy Director/WMD at the end of the year for the next year. These requests would then be ready to be reviewed by the Region 13 Equipment Committee for approval and submission to the State. Waiting for the State to ask for their request just delays the process. Departments should make their submissions as soon as possible to speed up the reimbursement process and to receive their requests quicker.
The Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program guidelines states that whenever an ORANGE threat alert level is given that the state and local municipalities may receive an additional 20% of the gross amount of their award to receive reimbursement for overtime costs for personnel to meet this ORANGE level alert. These funds specify that they must be used for overtime pay and not allowed to be used for extra personnel.
FINDING: The City did not do a good job at following the strict guidelines for this requirement of receiving reimbursement for personnel used during an ORANGE level alert for the years 2003 and 2004. Therefore, they were not eligible to receive any of this extra 20% for overtime personnel when at an ORANGE level alert.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 3:
The City should do a better job at documenting the overtime pay used during these ORANGE alert times so they can receive the extra funding available to pay for the required personnel. All City departments need to be educated on how to properly document this overtime pay during ORANGE level alerts.